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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Even though the right to self-determination has only “vague and imprecise” 
“meaning and content,”1 it has been invoked by numerous groups2 as a vehicle to achieve 
various ends, the majority of which relate to freedom. 3  Alternatively, these groups may 
achieve greater freedom by pressing for democracy. 4  The relationship between self-
determination and democracy is complex.  On the one hand, democracy may be an 
alternative to self-determination, i.e. a minority or unrepresented people may attain equal 
rights with the majority or the represented and thus become “self-governing” through a 
struggle for democracy.  In this way the attainment of democracy may eliminate the need 
for pursuing self-determination. 5  On the other hand, democracy may be a component of 
self-determination.  In the Wilsonian formulation, self-determination includes an internal 
aspect of democracy, because, as self-rule, self-determination “implies meaningful 
participation in the process of government.”6  This aspect of self-determination is 
commonly referred to as “internal self-determination.”7   
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1 HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 27 (rev. ed. 1996). 
2 See, e.g., Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age, 
32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255, 258-59 (1996) (“The right to self-determination is invoked in international law 
more often than any other collective human rights. . . . At a political level, it is proclaimed by, and on 
behalf of, non-state populations as diverse as the Kurds, the Quebecois, the Basques, the Scots, the 
Palestinians, the East Timorese and the Tamils.”). 
3 See, e.g., id. at 286 (listing various “interpretations and results of movements in the name of self-
determination”, including “the West European search for union, indigenous demands for autonomy, 
feminist claims to participation, liberal theories of democracy or internal self-determination, reunification 
agreements, the criminalization of colonial domination, declarations on partial sovereignty, and the 
reconstruction of failed states, . . .[e]ven secession. . .”). 
4 According to Amartya Sen, democracy entails “voting and respect for election results, . . . , the protection 
of liberties and freedoms, respect for legal entitlements, and the guaranteeing of free discussion and 
uncensored distribution of news and fair comment.” Amartya Sen, Democracy as a Universal Value, 10 J. 
DEMOCRACY 3, 9 (1999).  This comment will follow this concept of democracy. 
5 See Simpson, supra  note 2, at 279 (“The Kantian view . . . envisages a federation of sovereign states in 
which each state holds regular, public, universal, and free elections.  In this way, each person is secured his 
or her right to personal political self-determination.”). 
6 HANNUM, supra  note 1, at 30. 
7 MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 17 (1992).  In contrast, 
external self-determination represents the idea that people have the right to free from external coercion or 
alien domination. Id.  See also  Russell A. Miller, Self-Determination in International Law and the Demise 
of Democracy?, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT 'L L. 601, 617 (2003) (“[T]he external dimension or aspect [of 
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¶2 However, internal self-determination was disregarded from the beginning of the 
modern concept of self-determination. 8  Only in the post-decolonization era did the 
international community begin to recognize the importance of internal self-
determination. 9  In 1990, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
explicitly associated internal self-determination with Western-style democracy. 10  In the 
final days before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the European 
Community and the United States openly conditioned their recognition of the republics of 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia on the realization of the internal self-determination of 
their peoples.11  All the republics of the Soviet Union and four of the six Yugoslav 
republics accepted such a condition and gained recognition of the international 
community soon after.12  
¶3 However, the United Nations (“U.N.”) failed to emphasize internal self-
determination in its intervention in the self-determination efforts of East Timor.  The 
U.N. granted East Timor independence from Indonesia and then carried out an expensive 
nation-building mission there.13  However, the U.N. civil authority in East Timor was not 
representative of, or accountable to, the East Timorese people and could be characterized 
as “benevolent despotism.”14  In addition, East Timor’s political leaders built “few bonds 
with average [East] Timorese” and made decisions with little interaction with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
self-determination] defines the status of a people in relation to another people, State or Empire, whereas the 
democratic or internal dimension [of self-determination] should concern the relationship between a people 
and its own State or government.” (quoting Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-
Determination with Some Remarks on Federalism, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 101 
(Christian Tomuschat ed.,1993))). 
8 The states created after First World War “undertook no specific obligation to ensure a democratic form of 
government” save for “various minority guarantees.” HANNUM, supra  note 1, at 30.  In the de-colonization 
era, “between 1945 and 1979, seventy territories achieved independence without regard to the nature of the 
relationship between the governing institutions of the newly independent states and the people over which 
they exercised their sovereign authority.” Miller, supra  note 7 at 622 (quoting ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-
DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 339 (1995)). 
9 Miller, supra  note 7, at 624. 
10 Id. 
11 See id.; Halperin, supra  note 7, at 27-38 (describing international community’s reaction to the breakup of 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia).  Four days after the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus declared the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States designated the commitment to democratic political 
process as one of the basic principles for its overall approach to the self-determination claims of the Soviet 
republics. Id. at 31.  Soon after, the European Community announced that to gain its recognition, the 
republics of both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia would have to “respect the provisions of the U.N. 
Charter, Helsinki Final Act, and Charter of Paris, particularly with regard to the rule of law, democracy and 
human rights.” Id. at 33.  
12 Id. at 30-31, 35-37.  The four of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the 
“SFRY”) that accepted the conditions of the United States and the European Community and gained their 
recognition were Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Id. at 35.  The remaining two 
republics, Serbia and Montenegro, formed a new federation of Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, which “regarded the disintegration of the SFRY as a process of serial secession” and “claimed 
to be the exclusive legal and political continuator of the SFRY.” Carsten Stahn, The Agreement on 
Succession Issues of the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 379, 379-80 
(2002).  
13 Joel C. Beauvais, Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of U.N. State-Building in East Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 1101, 1102-04 (2001); Jane Perlez, Ramos-Horta is Appointed New Premier of East Timor, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2006, at 14 (“ Several billion dollars in international aid was spent to help East Timor 
build its own army, police force and judicial system, and on the United Nations peacekeeping force that 
came to East Timor after a vote in favor of independence in 1999.”). 
14 Beauvais, supra  note 13, at 1114. 
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people.15  Although East Timor has shown some remarkable improvements since the end 
of Indonesian occupation, 16 its people actually became poorer, especially after the U.N. 
downsized its mission. 17  Months before the U.N.’s planned end of its nation-building 
mission, the newborn state descended into chaos again. 18  Four years after its 
independence, people were still “asking whether East Timor ha[d] any future at all as an 
independent nation.”19 
¶4 This article uses the East Timor case to illustrate the importance of the link 
between self-determination and democracy.  Built upon the notion that only democracy 
validates governance,20 it argues that democracy is an indispensable complement for self-
determination, and offers three reasons.  First, only through popular participation can the 
will of the “self,” i.e. the will of a group of people that is entitled to self-determination, 
be ascertained.  Second, the right to democracy is the natural bridge between self-
determination as a group right and the well-being of individual group members.  Only 
through democratic process can any individual meaningfully participate in the realization 
of self-determination.  Third, only democracy can minimize the transaction costs 
associated with self-determination and make it an efficient outcome for the society.  
¶5 Part II of this Article provides some background information on the self-
determination movement of East Timor and the recent outbreak of violence in the spring 
of 2006.  Part III reviews international scholars’ discourses on the relationship between 
democracy and self-determination and argues that their approval or disapproval of the 
right to self-determination correlates with their understanding of the relationship between 
democracy and self-determination.  In turn, Part IV through VI discusses how democracy 
can ascertain the true will of a group, individualize the right to self-determination, and 
make self-determination an efficient outcome.  Part VII concludes. 
II. EAST TIMOR: BACKGROUND 
¶6 The island of Timor was divided into East and West Timor by the Portuguese and 
Dutch colonists.21  When West Timor gained independence from the Netherlands as part 
of Indonesia in 1949, East Timor remained a Portuguese colony. 22  After Portugal became 
a democracy in 1974, it accelerated the decolonization of East Timor23 and evacuated its 
                                                 
15 Joshua Kurlantzick, The U.N. Success Story That Wasn’t , WASH. POST , June 4, 2006, at B4. 
16 Id. 
17 Jane Perlez, Poverty and Violence Sink Grand Plans for East Timor, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2006, at A3. 
18 Jane Perlez, East Timor’s Capital Spirals into Violence, Despite U.N. Peacekeepers, N.Y. TIMES, May 
27, 2006, at 16. 
19 Jane Perlez, A Nation-Building Project Comes Apart in East Timor, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2006, at A3. 
20 Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 46-49 
(1992). 
21 Herbert D. Bowman, Letting the Big Fish Get Away: the United Nations Justice Effort in East Timor, 18 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 371, 374 (2004). 
22 Gerry J. Simpson, Judging the East Timor Dispute: Self-Determination at the International Court of 
Justice, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP . L. REV. 323, 324 (1993-1994).  In 1960 the United Nations 
recognized East Timor as a non-self-governing territory with the right to self-determination and granted 
Portugal the administrating power of East Timor. Roger S. Clark, East Timor, Indonesia, and the 
International Community, 14 TEMP . INT’L & COMP . L. J. 75, 78 (2000). 
23 HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT : LAW, POLITICS, 
MORALS: TEXT AND MATERIAL 673 (2000). 
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forces from East Timor in August 1975.24  In the subsequent power vacuum came a civil 
war among pro-Portuguese, pro-Indonesia, and pro- independence forces.25  The pro-
independence party won the war26 and announced the independence of East Timor in 
November 1975, while the other East Timor political parties announced East Timor’s 
integration with Indonesia.27  In December 1975, the Indonesian army invaded East 
Timor and took substantial control of the territory. 28 
¶7 Under the military regime of President Suharto, Indonesia formally integrated East 
Timor in July 1976.29  This move met with strong disapproval from the international 
community.  The U.N. condemned the illegal invasion and repeatedly requested 
Indonesia’s withdrawal.30  On the ground, armed resistance continued to challenge 
Indonesia’s effective control. 31  Nevertheless, Indonesia stood firm on its position until 
Suharto stepped down in May 1998.32  His successor, President Habibie, proposed a grant 
of special autonomy to East Timor in June 1998.33  Much negotiation ensued.34  In May 
1999, Indonesia, Portugal and the U.N. signed agreements authorizing the U.N. to help 
the East Timorese choose between autonomy and independence via a popular 
consultation (the “1999 Agreements”).35  In August 1999, at the popular consultation 
conducted by the United Nations Mission to East Timor (“UNAMET”), 78.5% of those 
who voted disfavored the autonomy proposal36 despite intimidation by the pro-Indonesia 
militias.37  The international community read this as a clear expression of the will of East 
Timorese for separation from Indonesia.38 
¶8 Displeased by this result, the pro-Indonesia militias, with the acquiescence and 
even support of the Indonesian military, “launched a massive campaign of violence.”39  
The escalation in violence led the U.N. to authorize a multinational force to restore peace 
and security in East Timor in September 1999.40  The violence also resulted in the 
departure of Indonesian civil administrators from East Timor.41  In October 1999, the 
                                                 
24 HALPERIN, supra  note 7, at 136. 
25 Id. Both the pro-Portuguese party, the Democratic Union of East Timor (“UDT”), and the pro-
independence party, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (“FRETILIN”), sought 
eventual independence.  However, UDT “favored a transitional period,” in which Portugal would keep 
participating in the governance of East Timor, while FRETILIN called form immediate independence. 
Jennifer Toole, A False Sense of Security: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Organization and 
Conduct Mission in East Timor, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 199, 207 (2000). 
26 Clark, supra  note 22, at 79. 
27 Jani Purnawanty, Various Perspectives in Understanding the East Timor Crisis, 14 TEMP . INT’L & COMP . 
L. J. 61, 65 (2000); Toole, supra  note 25, at 208. 
28 Clark, supra  note 22, at 79. 
29 Purnawanty, supra  note 27, at 61.  
30 Id.  Additionally, the U.N. continued to regard Portugal as East Timor’s administrative power.  Id. 
31 Id.  See also  Clark, supra  note 22, at 79. 
32 Purnawanty, supra  note 27, at 61. 
33 Id. at 66. 
34 Id.  See also  Toole, supra note 25, at 214-15. 
35 Purnawanty, supra  note 27, at 66-67.  
36 Id. 
37 Toole, supra  note 25, at 215. 
38 Purnawanty, supra  note 27, at 67. 
39 Toole, supra  note 33, at 204, 216. 
40 STEINER & ALSTON, supra  note 23, at 674.  
41 Mark Rothert, U.N. Intervention in East Timor, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 257, 261 (2000). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [ 2 0 0 7  
 
 180
Indonesian legislature formally recognized the result of the popular consultation42 and 
repealed the legislation that decla red East Timor a province of Indonesia.43  The 
Indonesian military withdrew the last of its personnel in late October.44  In the same 
month the U.N. set up the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(“UNTAET”) to administer East Timor during its transition to independence,45 with a 
mandate to exercise all legislative and executive powers in East Timor, including the 
administration of justice.46 
¶9 Under U.N. administration, East Timor adopted a Constitution, 47 which “provides 
for a unitary democratic State, based on the rule of law and the principle of separation of 
powers.”48  East Timor became an independent country on May 20, 2002.49  The U.N. 
then ended the UNTAET mandate and established the United Nations Mission of Support 
in East Timor (“UNMISET”) to continue its nation-building assistance in East Timor.50  
After three years of service, UNMISET was downsized and renamed the United Nations 
Office in Timor Leste (“UNOTIL”), which had a mandate to carry out peace-building 
activities until May 19, 2006.51  The international community had regarded East Timor’s 
nation-building since the popular consultation as a success story until the spring of 
2006.52  Among the major achievements in East Timor were peaceful politics, a 
functioning civil society and the foundations of a vibrant economy. 53  However, several 
problems gradually became salient.  First, the country’s political leaders “built few bonds 
with average [East] Timorese” and were unresponsive to the needs of the people.54  
Second, the leaders relied on their personalities, rather than institution-building, to solve 
the problems their country faced.55  Third, the leaders had the country’s international 
relations take priority over domestic issues.56  Fourth, with an already weak private 
sector, the leaders failed to provide enough public-works programs to counter the U.N. 
mission’s downsizing and resulting cut in local jobs.57  Fifth, the ethnic conflicts among 
people from different parts of the country, especially between the military and police, 
gradually intensified.58 
                                                 
42 STEINER & ALSTON, supra  note 23, at 674. 
43 Clark, supra  note 22, at 85. 
44 Id. 
45 STEINER & ALSTON, supra  note 23, at 674. 
46 Carla Bongiorno, A Culture of Impunity: Applying International Human Rights Law to the United 
Nations in East Timor, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 623, 628 (2002). 
47 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor, ¶4, delivered to the Security Council , U.N. Doc. S/2002/432 (Apr. 17, 2002). 
48 Id. at ¶5.  
49 Jane Perlez, Impoverished East Timor Exults Over Independence, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2002, at A6. 
50 S.C. Res. 1410, ¶1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1410 (May 17, 2002). 
51 S.C. Res. 1599, ¶1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1599 (Apr. 28, 2005). 
52 Kurlantzick, supra  note 15.  As an example of this reliance on the personality of leaders, the president, 
Xanana Gusmao, visited many military officials to ask them to cool off after the rumors of a possible fight 
among soldiers spread out in March 2006, without the government addressing the core demand of the 
soldiers. Id.  
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Perlez, supra  note 17; Emily Messner & J.J. Messner, A Lesson in How Not to Leave, WASH. POST , June 
10, 2006, at A19. 
58 Perlez, supra  note 17.  See also , Alan Sipress, In. E. Timor, an Optimistic Enterprise Turns to Ashes, 
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¶10 When East Timor built its armed forces, the soldiers from the anti-Indonesia 
guerrillas, who came mostly from the easternmost part of the country, took the senior 
positions, while the lower ranks were recruited from the western part of the country. 59  
Meanwhile, the police mainly consisted of people who served as policemen during 
Indonesian occupation, 60 with its senior officers mostly coming from the western part of 
the territory. 61  The guerrilla-turned-military personnel hated the ex-Indonesian police 
officers.62  The U.N.’s favoritism towards the police exacerbated the situation. 63  In 
January 2006, about 400 soldiers from the western part of the country complained about 
ethnic discrimination and poor treatment.64  Their complaints ignored, the western 
soldiers took to the streets in February 2006.65  Rather than addressing the grievances, the 
military fired nearly 600 westerners, or about 40% of the armed forces, and nearly all of 
its western members in March 2006.66  The dismissed soldiers staged another 
demonstration in late April 2006.67  This protest led to clashes among dismissed soldiers, 
the soldiers loyal to the government, and the police,68 which in turn provoked conflicts 
between gangs of easterners and westerners.69  The conflicts escalated into May 2006.70  
Unable to contain the extensive violence, the government called in an Australia-led 
force.71  Accused of “form[ing] a hit squad to kill his political opponents,” the Prime 
Minister Mari Alkatiri resigned in June 2006.72  The crisis was considered by some as 
“the worst” since 1999 and as a “serious setback” to the U.N.’s nation-building efforts in 
East Timor.73  Before delving into the implication of this crisis with regard to the 
understanding of the integral link between democracy and self-determination, the next 
section will review relevant literature. 
III. DEMOCRACY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: FRIEND OR FOE 
¶11 The relationship between democracy and self-determination has received 
significant academic attention.  Thomas M. Franck argues that the right to self-
determination evolved from “a principle of exclusion” to “one of inclusion” (the right to 
“free, fair and open participation” in the democratic governance of each state).74  He 
regards self-determination as a building block of democratic entitlement, his notion that 
                                                                                                                                                 
WASH. POST , June 2, 2006, at A13; Jane Perlez, Australian Forces in Timor Capital to Deter Warring 
Sides, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2006, at A7. 
59 Sipress, supra  note 58. 
60 Kurlantzick, supra  note 15. 
61 Sipress, supra  note 58. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. 
64 Id.  




69 Alan Sipress, E. Timor Premier Bows to Pressure, Submits Resignation – Alkatiri Allegedly Formed 
Death Squad , WASH. POST , June 27, 2006, at A17. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. 
74 Franck, supra  note 20, at 46, 59. 
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only democracy validates governance,75 and sees reciprocity between democracy and 
self-determination.  Self-determination is “the historic root from which the democratic 
entitlement grew.”76  On the other hand, since self-determination is implemented 
selectively, it lacks coherence and must merge with other components of democratic 
entitlement to increase its legitimacy. 77  He envisions that “collective international 
processes” will let democracy become a “global entitlement.”78 
¶12 Amitai Etzioni is not so optimistic about self-determination’s capacity of advancing 
democracy.  He believes that “with rare exceptions,” self-determination movements 
actually “undermine the potential for democratic development in non-democratic 
countries and threaten the foundations of democracy in democratic ones.”79  He argues 
that, historically, the moral approval self-determination movements enjoyed was based on 
the belief that self-determination would bring more responsive and democratic 
government to the oppressed minority people.80  He proposes that only those self-
determination movements that will enhance democracy be supported.81  
¶13 Unlike Franck or Etzioni, who both ignore the variability of democracy, Russell A. 
Miller’s assessment of self-determination relies on the same concept of democracy that 
the self-determination movement uses.  He argues that what Franck sees as a strong link 
between democracy and self-determination is actually “limited to the common use of 
majority rule plebiscites and referendums in the process by which states have achieved 
self-determination.”82  Behind this guise of democracy often hides ethnic-nationalism, 
which has led to the creation of numerous undemocratic states in the names of fulfilling 
democratic ideals by self-determination. 83  Miller proposes to free democracy from the 
usurpation of ethnic-nationalism so that self-determination will not lead to the “demise of 
democracy.”84  He ultimately believes that, with an emphasis on internal self-
determination and an enriched concept of democracy, self-determination movements can 
bring about the advancement of democracy. 85  
¶14 Whereas Franck, Etzioni and Miller evaluate self-determination based on its effects 
on democracy, Gerry J. Simpson worries that democracy cannot meet the diverse needs 
of those who seek to self-determine.86  Simpson argues that the purpose of the right to 
self-determination is “to protect the collective human and democratic rights of minorities 
and unrepresented peoples.”87  Simpson doubts that the group self-determination can “be 
satisfied by the majoritarian model, even in the presence of minority rights.”88  Simpson’s 
mistake is that he equates democracy with mere majority rule and fails to appreciate the 
                                                 
75 Id. at 46, 52. 
76 Id. at 52. 
77 Id. at 86. 
78 Id. at 46. 
79 Amitai Etzioni, The Evils of Self-Determination, 89 FOREIGN POL’Y 21, 21 (1992-1993). 
80 Id. at 35. 
81 Id. at 21. 
82 Miller, supra  note 7, at 610. 
83 Id. at 608, 610, 633 
84 Id. at 647. 
85 Id. 
86 Simpson, supra  note 2, at 280. 
87 Id. at 258. 
88 Id. at 279. 
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full potential of democracy.  As Miller suggests, “nearly all” Western democracies have 
“abandoned or opted against winner-take-all, majority rule system of representation.”89 
¶15 Just as Simpson argues that democracy is insufficient to protect the democratic 
rights of minorities,90 Amy E. Eckert claims that “[t]o promote democracy as the only 
legitimate result of self-determination” fails to satisfy “the requirements of liberal 
democracy,”91 because the right to self-determination demands a free determination of 
political status, but the right to democracy entails a determination to be free.92  She 
alleges that Franck confuses the means of self-determination with a particular end.93  To 
equate self-determination with “one particular political outcome,” democracy or any 
other, “misconstrues the content of self-determination,” because “[m]andating that a 
people must determine to be free . . . significantly constrains their right to” self-
determination. 94  Therefore, “the right to democracy is not equivalent to self-
determination.”95  Eckert concludes that “a people could freely choose to organize itself 
undemocratically,” “[a]s long as the determination itself is freely made,” and that such a 
determination “must receive the same respect as a determination to be free.”96  
¶16 The problem with Eckert’s reasoning is that nothing in self-determination implies 
that it can only be exercised once and for all.  To what extent can one generation’s 
decision bind the future generations?  What if a people decide not to be free and then 
change their minds in four years?  Do they still have the right to revise their political 
status?  In a sense, every electorate in every liberal democracy periodically chooses not to 
be free by electing a set of people to hold public offices for a fixed term.  The need to 
have repeated and unconstrained exercise of the right to free determination necessarily 
leads to the determination to be free.  Democracy may not be as irrelevant or 
incompatible to self-determination as Eckert supposes.  
¶17 As discussed above, scholars’ attitudes towards self-determination correlate with 
their understanding about the link between self-determination and democracy.  On the 
one hand, Franck, Etzioni and Miller evaluate self-determination from the perspective of 
democracy.  While Franck promotes self-determination as an integral part of democratic 
entit lement and Etzioni denounces self-determination for damaging the advancement of 
democracy, Miller tries to reconcile the two by differentiating democracy.  On the other 
hand, Simpson and Eckert appraise democracy in light of the need for self-determination.  
Simpson argues that democracy is inadequate for self-determination, while Eckert 
suggests democracy is irrelevant to self-determination.  Their disassociation of 
democracy from self-determination contributes to their ambivalence toward the latter.  
However, their arguments are untenable as Simpson oversimplifies democracy and 
Eckert misconstrues self-determination.  Therefore, this article further investigates 
Franck’s perception of the integral link between self-determination and democracy 
through empirical study and ultimately finds strong support for it.  The next section will 
                                                 
89 Miller, supra  note 7, at 639.  
90 Simpson, supra  note 2, at 258. 
91 Amy E. Eckert, Free Determination or the Determination to be Free? Self Determination and the 
Democratic Entitlement, 4 UCLA  J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 55, 78 (1999). 
92 Id. at 62.  
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 57. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 71. 
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use the case of East Timor to illustrate why true self-determination should start from 
ascertaining the will of the “self” through democratic means. 
IV.  DEMOCRACY,  SELF, AND DETERMINATION 
¶18 Most discussions of self-determination begin with an attempt to break the concept 
into what is the “self” and what is “determination”. 97  The first step, the identification of a 
“self” (a group of people entitled to self-determination), includes both an objective 
element (whether the group has “certain objectively determinable common 
characteristics”) and a subjective element (whether the group considers itself 
“distinctive”).98  Although this identification usually is a difficult task,99 it is somewhat 
easier in the case of East Timor.  Objectively, East Timor is geographically separate from 
Portugal, and East Timorese are ethnically different from Portuguese; thus, the U.N. 
recognized East Timor as a non-self-governing territory with the right to self-
determination in 1960.100  Subjectively, East Timor’s self-awareness may be established 
by its prolonged resistance throughout Indonesian occupation and eventual vote to 
separate from Indonesia.  This led the U.N. to reaffirm its recognition that East Timor had 
the right to self-determination after Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor101 and to 
ultimately grant East Timor independence.  
¶19 A feature of the establishment and maintenance of East Timorese as a “self” with 
the right to self-determination relates to the disconnection between the objective and the 
subjective elements of a distinctive East Timorese people.  The East Timorese’s objective 
uniqueness was validated vis-à-vis the Portuguese,102 while their subjective self-
awareness was established vis-à-vis the Indonesians.  In other words, among the two 
elements necessary to establish the existence of an East Timorese people distinct from 
Indonesians, the objective element was carried over from the East Timorese’s geographic 
separateness and ethnic difference from the Portuguese, which they no longer had vis-à-
vis the West Timorese.  Surely it would not be impossible to establish an objective 
distinction between East and West Timorese.  But the point here is that this objective 
element is simply taken as a given, even though it led to a decision affecting the lives of 
all East Timorese.  
¶20 This disconnect leads to two problems.  First, the maintenance of East Timorese in 
1999 as the same “self” as East Timorese in 1960 overemphasized the country’s colonial 
origin at the expense of its more recent history.  Like the Indonesians, the Portuguese 
came uninvited and maintained a repressive regime in East Timor.103  As a result, the East 
Timorese asked for, and the U.N. recognized, their right to self-determination from 
                                                 
97 HANNUM, supra  note 1, at 30. 
98 Id. at 30-31. 
99 Id. at 31. 
100 Clark, supra  note 22, at 78. 
101 Id. at 78, 81. 
102 Throughout Portugal’s colonial control, East Timorese nationalist groups demanded independence. 
Purnawanty, supra  note 27, at 63.  This may serve as evidence that East Timorese people regarded 
themselves as a distinctive group vis -à-vis the Portuguese.  Therefore, before the Portuguese evacuated 
themselves in 1975, both the objective and subject distinctiveness of East Timorese was well-established 
vis -à-vis Portuguese.  However, as argued below, it is problematic to have the objective distinctiveness 
simply carried over to later generations of East Timorese. 
103 Id. 
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Portugal.  However, the East Timorese people in 1999, although direct descendants of 
East Timorese in 1960, were arguably a different group of people as they now speak 
Indonesian. 104  Further, they are now divided into easterners and westerners, with 
westerners less antagonistic toward Indonesian occupation. 105  However, they are still 
recognized as the same “self” as their forefathers.  This bequest limited the new 
generation’s freedom of choice and tilted the population’s will toward independence.  
This arguably also contributed to the pro-Indonesia militias’ violent behavior. 
¶21 Second, the maintenance of the East Timorese in 1999 as the same “self” as East 
Timorese in 1960 unduly eliminated the right of any sub-groups of East Timorese to the 
right to self-determination.  In 1960, any differences within East Timorese were dwarfed 
by their difference from the Portuguese and they were more resolute in seeking 
independence.106  However, the intra-group differences became more salient as East 
Timorese’s differences from Indonesians were much smaller and different groups had 
dissimilar attitudes towards Indonesia.  The dilemma that one group’s exercise of the 
right to self-determination may deny another group the same right thus became a bigger 
problem.  In view of these two problems, a fresh exercise in determining their objective 
distinctiveness before the 1999 popular consultation may well have helped the East 
Timorese discover who they are, what they share with the Indonesians, and what 
differentiates them.  Such reflection could have helped them make a more informed 
decision.  
¶22 After the identification of a “self,” the next step is to decide what and how to 
“determine.”  Per the 1999 Agreements, the future of East Timor was decided by East 
Timorese people through a popular consultation in the form of a universal, direct and 
secret ballot organized and conducted by the U.N.107  However, Miller suggests that the 
“rigid use of the majority rule, self-determination referendum is an example of . . . 
‘institutional fetishism,’”108 and could not serve as the “democratic” element of a self-
determination. 109  He argues that this might be because in Western democracies “winner-
take-all, majority decisions are radically circumscribed” out of a concern about the 
“tyranny of the majority,” while in self-determination referendums this consideration is 
ignored.110  In East Timor’s case, there is evidence of what Miller calls the “ethno-
nationalist and inherently undemocratic repercussions”111 of the referendum.  The 
political leaders inaugurated upon independence remained distant from the people and 
relied more on personalities than institutions to govern. 112  The Prime Minister Mari 
Alkatiri “changed the rules on voting” of his political party to suppress intra-party 
                                                 
104 Kurlantzick, supra  note 15. 
105 See supra  notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
106 As discussed in supra  note 25 and accompanying text, all the political forces emerged at the end of 
Portuguese colonial regime, i.e. the pro-Portuguese, the pro-Indonesia, and the pro-independence parties 
supported separation from Portugal. 
107 Purnawanty, supra  note 27, at 67. 
108 Miller, supra  note 7, at 644-45. 
109 Id. at 634. 
110 Id. at 634-35. 
111 Id. at 634. 
112 See supra  notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
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criticism, “passed a law making defamation” a serious crime,113 and “was accused of 
forming a hit squad to kill his political opponents.”114 
¶23 The use of the referendum as a self-determination device had several other 
problems.  First, the popular consultation was organized and conducted by an alien 
organization within only two months115 in a largely illiterate society116 with no democratic 
legacy.  The short time frame limited the East Timorese’s participation in the process.  
They hardly had time to have orderly debate about the pros and cons of either choice and 
to persuade each other.  This promoted simplistic and confrontational interpretations.  
The two months’ time also ruled out any give-and-take between Indonesia and East 
Timor on the condition of the autonomy.  Second, this arrangement put too much stake in 
a single vote and thus encouraged pro-Indonesia militias to use violence to intimidate 
East Timorese.  If the decision to separate had been made gradually in a series of events 
over a longer period, the pro-Indonesia forces may well have diverted their resources to 
political campaigning.  However, left with a referendum in two months, they may have 
found the threat of violence to be a shortcut.  Third, the referendum encouraged people 
who merely sought to change the status quo to vote for separation because the ballot 
offered only two choices, autonomy or independence. 
¶24 The anatomy of “self” and “determine” in the context of East Timor illustrates the 
importance of democracy in ascertaining the meaning of these two concepts in any self-
determination movement.  In identifying a “self,” democracy requires that the subjective 
and objective elements of the required distinction match each other because a people’s 
preference cannot be established through the expression of another.  In deciding the 
manner of “determine,” democracy emphasizes the process by which the preferences of 
the members of the people are mapped onto the collective preference of the group.  Here 
majority referendum is not enough.  The people must have the opportunity to freely 
partic ipate, scrutinize their options, and persuade themselves and each other.  Only 
through an unconditional acceptance of these requirements of democracy can the true will 
of a people be ascertained.  The next section will turn to the question of how democracy 
can bridge the group right of self-determination and the right of individuals. 
V. SELF-DETERMINATION AS A GROUP RIGHT 
¶25 Self-determination is a right of “peoples.”117  No matter how “peoples” are defined, 
they must be collectivities consisting of more than one individual. 118  James A. Graff 
asserts that one’s view of the right to self-determination depends ultimately on how one 
understands “the relations between the rights of collectivities and the rights of individuals 
who comprise them.”119  He finds that in reality the “tendency to think and talk about 
                                                 
113 Kurlantzick, supra note 15. 
114 Niniek Karmini, E. Timor Premier Sworn In , WASH. POST , June 10, 2006, at A11. 
115 The U.N. mission organizing and conducting the popular consultation was established on June 11, 1999 
and the East Timorese voted on August 30, 1999.  See Toole, supra  note 25, at 215; Rothert, supra  note 41, 
at 260. 
116 Perlez, supra  note 19 (“[M]uch of the population [of East Timor] is illiterate.”). 
117 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Mar. 23 1976, 999 U.N.T.S 171. 
118 James A. Graff, Human Rights, Peoples, and the Right to Self-determination, in GROUP RIGHTS 186, 186 
(Judith Baker ed., 1994). 
119 Id. at 187. 
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peoples as if they were individuals” is central to the right of self-determination. 120  In the 
case of East Timor, the maintenance of the East Timorese people in 1999 as the same 
“self” as those in 1960, discussed in the previous section, is clearly an example of 
treating an abstract collectivity as if it were “a clearly identifiable, single spatiotemporal 
agent.”121 
¶26 Three other features of the U.N.’s nation-building efforts in East Timor confirm 
that the U.N. regarded self-determination as a right belonging to an abstract “East 
Timorese people” rather than to any living East Timorese.  
¶27 First, if self-determination is regarded as a collective right independent of the rights 
of any individuals that constitute this group, there would be less incentive to consult any 
of the individuals in the implementation of this right, so long as the right is implemented 
in good faith for the benefit of this abstract “group.”  Therefore, although UNTAET was 
“charged with preparing the East Timorese for democratic self-government,”122 it 
operated “in an autocratic manner itself”123 or, as its head Special Representative Sergio 
Vieira de Mello put it, “by means of a style of ‘benevolent despotism.’”124  U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1272, in establishing UNTAET, did not provide for local 
participation in the transitional administration directly or through freely chosen 
representatives.125  Although it did require UNTAET to “consult and cooperate closely 
with the East Timorese people,” “sustained criticism suggests that UNTAET’s 
‘consultation’” through the two local advisory bodies it appointed “was cursory rather 
than genuine.”126  The lack of local participation may explain why UNTAET ignored 
those issues most pressing for local East Timorese.  For example, “[a]lthough most East 
Timorese are dirt-poor farmers” and the productivity of the rural economy “is the lowest 
in Asia, . . . little effort was made to improve basic agriculture during the United Nations 
administration.”127 
¶28 Second, if self-determination is regarded as a right belonging to an abstract group 
above and beyond any individual member of this group, there would be less incentive to 
make its implementation accountable to any of the individuals.  This may be why 
UNTAET regarded itself as “immune from local jurisdiction,”128 and chose to follow the 
custom that “[the] international staff of the U.N. mission [wa]s immune from prosecution 
in the country of deployment,”129 even though the usual justification for such immunity, 
i.e. “functional necessity,” did not apply in East Timor.130  Under this immunity 
                                                 
120 Id. at 194. 
121 Id. at 211. 
122 Beauvais, supra  note 13, at 1108.  
123 Ralph Wilde, Accountability and International Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East 
Timor, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP . L. 455, 458 (2001). 
124 Bongiorno, supra  note 46, at 656.  
125 See generally, S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999). 
126 Bongiorno, supra  note 46, at 657. 
127 Perlez, supra  note 19. 
128 Wilde, supra  note 123, at 456. 
129 Bongiorno, supra  note 46, at 661-62.  The “general immunity of the U.N. and its personnel derives from 
the U.N. Charter” and is provided in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations of 1946. Id. at 662-63.  However, that convention “does contain provisions on mandatory waiver 
for personnel” “in cases where the assertion of immunity would be an impediment to justice and can be 
waived without prejudice to the U.N.’s interest.” Id. at 665. 
130 Id. at 663. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [ 2 0 0 7  
 
 188
UNTAET personnel committed human right abuses, including arbitrary detention. 131  
This deficit of accountability may have undermined, by setting a precedent for 
“unaccountable, centralized and autocratic” governance in East Timor, UNTAET’s own 
objective of preparing East Timor for democratic self-government.132  In addition, it may 
also have resulted in local people’s perception that accountability applies only to them, 
but not to the U.N. officials, which may create the impression that the U.N. mission is “a 
paternalistic, imperialist endeavor.”133 
¶29 Third, if self-determination is regarded as a collective right that belongs to a group 
with a much longer lifespan than any individual member of the group, there would be less 
incentive to prioritize the realization of this right over other more visible short-term 
duties.  Thus, UNTAET’s nation-building efforts emphasized the minimization of “short-
term risk of failure” and the maximization of “short-term visible gains” over the “long-
term strategic objective of preparing the East Timorese for democratic self-
government.”134  From its beginning, UNTAET found a fundamental tension between its 
two mandates—administrating East Timor and preparing it for self-government.135  
Although the U.N. administration of East Timor was “not an end in itself, but a means to 
achieve . . . East Timorese self-government,” UNTAET’s “initial approach was biased 
heavily toward the short-term goals associated with” the U.N. administration and 
“effectively deprioritiz[ed] the move toward independent East Timorese statehood.”136  
Under intense pressure from the East Timorese, UNTAET gradually switched gears to 
focus more on preparation for East Timorese self-government.137  However, whether this 
shift was authentic or symbolic is still in dispute.138  The emphasis on U.N. administration 
and the inadequacy of UNTAET’s preparation for East Timorese self-government may 
explain why East Timor was a success story under UNTAET’s administration and 
UNMISET’s cons iderable assistance to East Timorese government, but then returned to 
chaos soon after the largely ineffective UNOTIL began to help.  
¶30 The problems with the U.N.’s treatment of East Timor’s right to self-determination 
as a group right without regard to the individual rights of East Timorese demonstrate the 
importance of justifying the group right to self-determination by the rights of individuals 
and implementing the right to self-determination with the welfare of each individual in 
mind.  The conception that the right to self-determination belongs to an abstract “people” 
is a fiction. 139  The East Timor case further illustrates the potential of democracy to link 
the group right to self-determination with the rights and well-beings of individuals.  Graff 
argues that if individuals are to be treated as equal and their human rights honored, the 
group right of self-determination must ultimately give way to a wide range of 
“democratic, political and legal rights” of the individuals.140  This suggests that an 
individual’s democratic rights should serve as the bridge between self-determination and 
                                                 
131 Id. at 630, 666-76.  
132 Wilde, supra  note 123, at 458. 
133 Id. at 459-60. 
134 Beauvais, supra  note 13, at 1106. 
135 Id. at 1107. 
136 Id. at 1114. 
137 Id. 
138 Id.  
139 Graff, supra  note 118, at 194. 
140 Id. at 187-88, 91. 
Vol. 6:1] Hua Fan 
   189 
the rights of individuals.  To become the true beneficiary of self-determination, each and 
every East Timorese must be consulted and afforded the opportunity to actively 
partic ipate in the implementation of self-determination.  The implementation must be 
made accountable to them and sufficient priority must be given to the capacity-building 
for their self-government.  Such participation and accountability requirements naturally 
demand that democracy serve as the bridge between self-determination as a group right 
and the rights of those individuals that constitute the group.  The next section will discuss 
how democracy can make self-determination an efficient outcome for those who seek it 
using economic analysis. 
VI. SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE COASE THEOREM 
¶31 Self-determination has a huge impact upon the welfare of countries.  Some of them, 
such as South Korea, have achieved substantial economic growth since independence.141  
Others, such as India, may have eliminated famine thanks to an independent statehood.142  
However, economics, a powerful tool for many other legal questions, has yet to be 
applied to self-determination. 143  This section will try to fill in that gap by examining self-
determination by applying the Coase Theorem.  
¶32 The Coase Theorem provides that if property rights are well-defined and 
transactions are costless, among the many competing uses of a property the most 
productive use will ultimately prevail, no matter what the initial allocation of a property 
right may be.144  Daron Acemoglu examines an extension of the Coase Theorem to the 
political field, i.e. the proposition that regardless of the allocation of political powers, the 
                                                 
141 In terms of international Geary-Khamis dollars of 1990, South Korea’s per capita income had grown 
from $770 to $12,152 between 1950 and 2001. Daron Acemoglu, Why not a Political Coase Theorem? 
Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics, 31 J. COMP . ECON. 620, 631-32 (2003).  Another example 
would be Singapore, whose per capita income had grown from $1,600 to $11,700 between 1960 and 1990 
in terms of 1985 dollars. Susan M. Collins, Barry P. Bosworth, Dani Rodrik, Economic Growth in East 
Asia: Accumulation versus Assimilation, 1996 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 135, 136 (1996).  
The average GDP growth rate of Singapore was 8.3% between 1960 and 1994. Id. 
142 Amartya Sen took this view in a series of works. Sen, supra  note 4, at 8 (“[W]hile India continued to 
have famines under British rule right up to independence . . . they disappeared suddenly with the 
establishment of a multiparty democracy and a free press.”).  Sen has further asserted that “no substantial 
famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press.” Id. at 7-
8.  He suggested this was because “a democratic government, facing elections and criticisms from 
opposition parties and independent newspapers, [could not] help but make” a serious effort to prevent 
famine. Id.  See also , Amartya Sen, Development: Which Way Now, 93 ECON. J. 745, 757 (1983); Amartya 
Sen, Rationality and Social Choice, 85 AM. ECON. REVIEW 1, 16-17 (1995).  
143 In fact, economic analysis has played a very limited role in international law in general.  Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman note that “the law and economics revolution,” the movement that applied 
“economic theories and methodologies to legal issues,” “has, with few exceptions, bypassed international 
law” and investigated “the applicability of economic analysis to the allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction, 
the law of treaties, and the competences of international organizations. Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. 
Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1999).  They also provide a 
bibliography of academic pieces on economic analysis on international law, but most of those works were 
on private international law. Id. at 56.  By far the only treatise on economic analysis of law, Posner’s 
Economic Analysis of Law, has just added some discussion on economics and the law of war in its most 
recent (sixth) edition. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 136-41 (6th ed. 2003).  A 
notable example of applying economic analysis to international human rights law is Jeffrey L. Dunoff and 
Joel P. Trachtman, The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law Violations in Internal Conflict , 93 
A.J.I.L. 394 (1999). 
144 Posner, supra  note 143, at 7; Acemoglu, supra  note 141, at 621. 
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policies and institutions ultimately established in a society under these powers should be 
the most efficient ones given the diverse needs of the society. 145  He rejects this Political 
Coast Theorem (“PCT”) because, while the Coase Theorem relies on enforceable 
contracts, the “inherent commitment problems associated with political powers” destroy 
the enforceability of contracts between the state and the citizens.146  
¶33 According to the PCT, the exercise of the right to self-determination, like any other 
political or economic transaction, should lead to the best outcome given the various needs 
and preferences of the society. 147  Suppose that self-determination, by enabling East 
Timorese to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and culture development,”148 increases their wealth149 by $6 billion but decreases 
that of Indonesia by $4.5 billion. 150  If East Timor has an enforceable right to self-
determination, it will go forward and use it.  If instead Indonesia has sovereignty over 
East Timor, East Timor will offer to pay, and Indonesia will accept, an amount between 
$4.5 and $6 billion, and both will be better off.  Likewise, if self-determination is actually 
not a good idea for East Timor and will increase the wealth of East Timorese by $4.5 
billion, but decrease that of Indonesia by $6 billion, Indonesia will either (1) hold on if it 
initially has the sovereignty over East Timor, or (2) pay between $4.5 and $6 billion to 
get the sovereignty over East Timor if it initially does not have it.  No matter where the 
sovereignty of East Timor initially stayed, it will end up with the party who has the more 
productive use for it. 
¶34 But this kind of transaction has never happened.  Instead, Indonesia chose to spend 
a large amount of resources maintaining its occupation of East Timor151 and East Timor 
                                                 
145 Acemoglu, supra  note 141, at 621.  Commitment problems arise when “parties holding political power 
cannot make commitments to bind their future actions.” Id. at 620. 
146 Id. at 622. 
147 Id.  In this section the words “good” and “efficient” are used interchangeably.  The concept of efficiency 
used here is the same as that used by Donald A. Wittman, i.e. efficiency means wealth-maximization. 
DONALD A. WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE: WHY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ARE 
EFFICIENT  3 (1995). 
148 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Mar. 23 1976, 999 U.N.T.S 171. 
149 Alternatively, we can also use “utility” here.  Economists define utility as “the level of happiness or 
satisfaction that a person receives from his or her circumstances.” N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMICS 439 (2006).  Utility captures the subjective dimension of what people pursue.  On the other 
hand, it is more straightforward to assign a dollar amount to wealth and compare the wealth that different 
people have.  In the case of self-determination, peoples may attach huge subjective value to an independent 
statehood or whatever other political status they may prefer.  However, how much welfare improvement or 
other economic benefits self-determinate may bring to people depends on many circumstantial factors and 
is therefore more objective.  In view of this, the section chooses to use “wealth” to develop the PCT 
analysis of self-determination.  In addition, the wealth increase here should be understood as the net 
increase or net decrease. 
150 These numbers, 6 billions and 4.5 billion, are arbitrarily chosen here to exemplify a different value of 
the territory of East Timor to East Timorese as compared to the value Indonesians attach to the territory.  
Although arbitrary, they may not be totally out of scale.  The GDP of East Timor, using the purchasing 
power parity method, was estimated to be around 370 million U.S. dollars in 2004. CENT . INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2006 (2006), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tt.html.  The real GDP growth rate in 2005 was 
estimated at 1.8%. Id.  Assume that the opportunity cost of capital is 10%, the value of a perpetuity 
consisting of East Timor’s future GDP’s would be about $4.5 billion U.S. dollars.  If East Timor were able 
to double its real growth rate once they became more proficient in self-governing, the value of the 
perpetuity would be about $5.8 billion U.S. dollars. 
151 Indonesia had spent $832 million U.S. dollar to develop East Timor during its occupation of the latter. 
Purnawanty, supra  note 27, at 69.  Maintaining a troop in East Timor was not cheap either.  For example, 
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suffered tremendously from its strife against Indonesia 152 until Indonesia withdrew after 
the U.N.-sponsored popular consultation. 153  This appears to be an outcome inefficient to 
both parties.  One potential explanation for this is what Acemoglu labels as modified 
PCT.154  This modification tries to save PCT by arguing that political leaders may hold 
different beliefs about which political actions lead to the best outcome for the society. 155  
Therefore, the leaders of Indonesia may have thought that the value of East Timor was $9 
billion when the true value was $4.5 billion.  They insisted on retaining the sovereignty 
of East Timor because they thought they could make more productive use of it.  
However, Acemoglu argues that the difference in beliefs cannot sufficiently rationalize 
the inefficient outcome when the leaders have maintained the inefficiency for an 
extended period.156  Even if the Indonesian leaders asserted their initial claim over East 
Timor out of mistaken beliefs, they had two decades to update their beliefs and change 
their inefficient policies.  Their steadfastness indicates that the modified PCT cannot 
explain their behaviors. 
¶35 Acemoglu instead suggests that such sustained inefficiency might be explicated by 
a social conflict theory (“SCT”).  According to this theory, political decision-makers 
choose policies and institutions to maximize their own benefits, rather than the aggregate 
welfare of the society. 157  Indeed, the Indonesian leader behind the invasion and 
occupation of East Timor, Mohamed Suharto,158 has been listed as the world’s most 
corrupt leader.159  Some observers even claim that the established investments in East 
Timor from the families of Suharto and certain elites in the Indonesian military are the 
true reason that Indonesia’s military was involved in the post-referendum violence.160  
Acemoglu further proposes that, under SCT, political elites do not corrupt efficiently 
because of the inherent commitment problem attached to political powers.161  If one were 
to put Acemoglu’s theory into practice, Suharto could have used his authority to strike a 
deal with East Timor and put the amount East Timor would be willing to pay for 
                                                                                                                                                 
Indonesia spent $2.25 million U.S. dollars on “routine armed forces expenditure in East Timor” in the fiscal 
year 1977-78 alone. George J. Aditjondro, Prospects for Development in East Timor after the Capture of 
Xanana Gusmao, in International Law and the Question of East Timor 50, 54 (CIIR/IPJET ed., 1995).  In 
addition, the current President of East Timor, Xanana Gusmao, once estimated that between 25,000 and 
30,000 Indonesian soldiers had died in East Timor. Id. 
152 It is estimated that from 1975 to the early 1990s, 250,000 East Timorese, about a third of East Timor’s 
population, died as a result of the fighting between Indonesian military and East Timor resistance. 
Bongiorno, supra  note 46, at 625. 
153 See supra  notes 37-46 and accompanying text. 
154 Acemoglu, supra  note 141, at 621. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 632-33. 
157 Id. at 621. 
158 See supra  notes 29-32 and accompanying text. 
159 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2004 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/global_corruption_report__1/download_gcr/download_gcr_2004
.  Transparency International alleged that Suharto embezzled between $15 to 35 billion U.S. dollars during 
his 31 years’ rule of Indonesia, when the GDP per capita of his country was less than $700 U.S. dollars. Id.  
This is far more than what most other dictators siphoned off from their countries.  Ferdinand Marcos, 
regarded as the second most corrupt leader by Transparency International, looted between $5 to 10 billion 
U.S. dollars during his 14 years’ rule of the Philippines. Id.  
160 Purnawanty, supra  note 27, at 67-68. 
161 Acemoglu, supra  note 141, at 622.  If political elite were to corrupt efficiently, it would “make a deal 
with the rest of the society to choose the policies and institutions that maximize output or social welfare, 
and then redistribute part of the gains to themselves.” Id. 
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independence into his own pocket.  If such a deal had gone through, it could have led to 
an outcome as efficient for the East Timorese as if they paid the Indonesian treasury.  
Such a deal did not happen because it was not enforceable.  Suharto could not commit to 
granting East Timor independence, because as the dictator of Indonesia he could easily 
renege after receiving a bribe.  On the other hand, Suharto also had reason to doubt 
whether East Timorese would make the payments if he first granted them independence 
and thus lost control of them.  
¶36 The international community did not provide alternative enforcement mechanisms 
sufficient for the prevalence of an efficient outcome in East Timor either, although the 
U.N. has provided enforcement assistance to other kinds of state-citizen commitments.162  
Before the U.N.’s enforcement of the 1999 Agreements, it limited its role in the 
resolution of the East Timor question to that of a mediator and almost entirely delegated 
that task to Portugal. 163  As it turned out, the Portuguese, as ex-colonists, failed to bring 
enough credibility to the table, and the implementation of the 1999 Agreements still 
needed the U.N. to supervise.164  On the other hand, the international community’s 
selectivity in implementing the right to self-determination brought ambiguity and 
uncertainty to that right.165  This destroyed a prerequisite for PCT, as well as the Coase 
Theorem, i.e. a well-defined legal right,166 and further exacerbated the problem.  
¶37 Acemoglu suggests that autocratic leaders might solve the commitment problem by 
democratization because by giving up power they could gain credibility. 167  Douglass C. 
North and Barry R. Weingast demonstrate how “the fundamental institutions of 
representative government emerging out of the Glorious Revolution” made the English 
Crown’s commitment to honor its debts creditable and therefore significantly improved 
its ability to borrow. 168  These, if applied to East Timor’s self-determination, would 
suggest that democratization of Indonesia would solve the commitment problem of 
Indonesian leaders and would more likely lead to an efficient solution of the East Timor 
question.  This was precisely what happened.  After Suharto stepped down, Habibie, who 
initiated Indonesia’s transition to democracy, 169 proposed granting special autonomy to 
East Timor within a month and later agreed to let East Timorese decide their future by 
referendum to relieve Indonesia of the heavy political and economic burden of East 
Timor.170  Besides solving the commitment problem, democracy guarantees the free 
                                                 
162 For example, since the early 1990s the U.N. has provided electoral monitoring to many independent 
member states whose domestic political process couldn’t lead to free elections.  The U.N. conducted its 
first election supervision in Nicaragua in 1990. Franck, supra  note 20, at 71-72.  During that mission, U.N. 
observers “mediated disputes between candidates concerning access to funding, the media and even the 
streets,” “oversaw the rights of political parties to organize and campaign,” and “investigated numerous 
charges of abuses and irregularities.” Id. at 72. 
163 Toole, supra  note 25, at 213-15; Rothert, supra  note 41, at 259. 
164 See supra  notes 35-46 and accompanying text. 
165 See supra  notes 1, 77 and accompanying text. 
166 Acemoglu, supra  note 141, at 621. 
167 DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 
176 (2005). 
168 Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions 
Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HISTORY 803 (1989). 
169 Seth Mydans, Indonesia's Presidential Flash in the Pan, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 200, at 13 (“[Habibie] 
pursued a remarkably steady course toward democracy, . . . freed the press, the labor unions and the 
political parties, and began the slow process of pulling the military out of politics.”). 
170 Purnawanty, supra  note 27, at 65-66. 
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discussion and distribution of information and “helps society to form its values and 
priorities.”171  Therefore, under democracy, Indonesians and East Timorese could more 
easily discover the most efficient solution of the East Timor question.  This would 
promote the mutual understanding between the two peoples and reduce the risk of violent 
conflict. 
¶38 The end of autocracy in Indonesia led to the secession of East Timor.  
Unfortunately, for East Timor, an independent statehood did not signify the end of 
inefficiency.  Since being in power, the political leaders of East Timor have set up many 
seemingly unproductive policies.  First, the leaders chose Portuguese as the official 
language, even though only 5% of the population speaks it; most East Timorese speak 
Indonesian, and the local language is Tetum. 172  As a result, East Timor had to import 
hundreds of elementary school teachers from Portugal.173  Choosing Portuguese as the 
official language also impeded the establishment of a functioning judiciary, as few local 
judges were proficient in Portuguese.174  Second, the leaders set the fee for registering a 
business higher than the annual per capita income of $370, which discouraged private 
enterprise.175  Third, the leaders built an army not to provide self-defense, but to create 
jobs for the ex-freedom fighters and to prevent them from joining the militia.176  This was 
seen as a “fatal flaw” in East Timor’s nation-building177 and eventually led to the riot in 
2006.178  Again, only democracy could bring efficient policies and institutions to East 
Timor as an independent state.  Donald A. Wittman argues that in democracies “political 
entrepreneurs are rewarded for efficient behavior” and that “democratic political 
markets” are efficient179 because “[d]emocratic political markets are structured to reduce 
transaction costs” and low transaction costs bring efficiency. 180  Although East Timor is a 
democratic state under its Constitution, it is very young and still suffers from the 
undemocratic elements it inherited from its preexistence as a Portuguese colony and an 
Indonesian province.181  Only through further nation-building and democratic 
consolidation can it begin to reap the efficiency that democracy may provide. 
¶39 In sum, self-determination has significant instrumental value to societies besides its 
intrinsic value for peoples.182  An economic analysis of East Timor’s self-determination 
                                                 
171 Sen, supra  note 4, at 10. 
172 Kurlantzick, supra  note 15; Perlez, supra  note 49. 
173 Perlez, supra  note 19. 
174 Id.; Messner & Messner, supra  note 57. 
175 Perlez, supra  note 17.  Economists generally see such high entry barrier as inefficient. Acemoglu, supra  
note 141, at 627-28.  In comparison, “the total cost of opening a medium-size business in the United States 
is less than 2 percent of GDP per capita in 1999.” Id. at 628. 
176 Perlez, supra  note 19. 
177 Id. 
178 See supra  notes 59-71 and accompanying text. 
179 Wittman, supra  note 147, at 2. 
180 Id. at 31-32. 
181 See supra  notes 54-55, 111-14 and accompanying text. 
182 According to Amartya Sen, the intrinsic value of things is “their value as ends on their own right,” while 
the instrumental value of things is their value “as means to other ends.” Amartya Sen, Freedom of Choice: 
Concept and Content, 32 EUROPEAN ECON. REVIEW 269, 270 (1988).  Under this conception, the intrinsic 
value of self-determination is its value as an end in its own right.  On the other hand, the instrumental value 
of self-determination is its value as a means to other ends, such as the improvement of social welfare or the 
maximization of wealth.  This article takes self-determination’s potential effect on the improvement of 
social welfare and wealth maximization as one of its instrumental values and argues that self-determination 
should be engineered so as to maximize this instrumental value to the extent possible.  It  assumes the 
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and beyond shows that self-determination alone does not necessarily lead to improvement 
in social welfare, but that democracy can help.  Before self-determination, democracy can 
solve the commitment problem that may obstruct the political elite from instituting 
efficient policies regarding self-determination claims.  Democracy can also help people 
discover the best outcome for themselves.  After self-determination, democracy can 
reduce the transaction costs of political actions in the new state and bring efficiency to its 
policies and institutions.  Additionally, self-determination’s potential for confrontation or 
even armed conflicts makes the synergy of democracy and self-determination all the 
more imperative.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
¶40 This article demonstrates the enormous value-adding potential of democracy to the 
right to self-determination through the case study of East Timor.  First, democracy can 
help identify: (1) whether a group qualifies for the right to self-determination by better 
ascertaining its members’ subjective beliefs and matching those with its objective 
distinctiveness; and (2) whether and how a group wants to exercise that right by better 
aggregating the individual preferences to a collective choice.  Second, democracy can 
better deliver and individualize the group right of self-determination and ensure that the 
respect for the rights and well-being of each individual serves as a guiding principle for 
the implementation of self-determination.  Third, democracy can augment the 
instrumental value of self-determination and promote more efficient policies and 
institutions, both during self-determination by discerning whether self-determination is 
welfare- improving and after the entrenchment of the new political status by reducing 
political transaction costs.  Dozens of self-determination movements have been achieved 
without any pressure for democracy, 183 but democracy is the force that elevates self-
determination into something truly appealing. 
¶41 This, however, does not imply that democracy is always secondary to self-
determination or that democracy is only the second best thing that a people can hope for 
with regard to the protection of human rights.  Independent statehood is not necessarily 
the best vehicle to protect the rights and interests of minority peoples.  The cases of 
Belgium and Switzerland show that a “truly democratic state” must be responsive to any 
minority groups and be capable of preserving separate “culture, tradition, religion, or 
language.”184  A larger society is more conducive to pluralism because it is more likely to 
have multiple social cleavages that cut a higher share of the population into minorities.  
In such a setting, the commitment from any group in power to protect the minority rights 
is more credible because any member of the group in power may find itself likely to be a 
minority in the future.  For example, the East Timorese may have allied with the 
Acehnese and Irian Jayan, 185 or Indonesia’s religious minorities, such as the atheists,186 to 
                                                                                                                                                 
existence of the intrinsic value of self-determination and argues for a more balanced approach to the two 
values with regard to self-determination, i.e. to take one into sufficient consideration when trying to 
maximize the other.  Of course, if the intrinsic value of self-determination does not exist, the argument of 
this article that self-determination should be engineered so as to maximize its instrumental values will be 
even stronger.  
183 See supra  note 8 and accompanying text. 
184 Id. at 26-27. 
185 Aceh and Irian Jaya are the two Indonesian provinces that have active claims to self-determination. 
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gain equal rights for all minorities.  On the other hand, self-determination has put into 
power some of the most predatory and oppressive regimes in recent history. 187  Thus, 
democracy should not give way to self-determination or wait until after self-
determination. 
¶42 In conclusion, there is a strong link between democracy and self-determination, as 
demonstrated by the pre- and post- independence experiences of East Timor.  Democracy 
is the catalyst for self-determination to bring about the advancement of human rights and 
the improvement of the general welfa re of societies.  To fully contribute its benefits, self-
determination must be implemented strictly according to the requirements of democracy.  
Only then will the full potential of self-determination be unleashed, in East Timor and 
beyond. 
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186 DEP’T OF STATE, THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT  2006 (2006), available at 
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